We model a market where identical buyers direct their search to identical capacity-constrained sellers. Sellers cannot fully commit to the list price so strategic bargaining may determine the sale price. We study search and pricing behavior in symmetric equilibrium. Sale prices exhibit equilibrium dispersion as they respond naturally to local demand conditions. Uncoordinated search decisions lead to equilibrium demand heterogeneity, so sellers realizing large demand bargain prices up. We characterize the sale price distribution parametrically, studying how different commitment limitations and market features affect pricing and surplus shares. We also determine endogenously the pricing institution. Implications for labor and goods markets are explored.
Introduction
The existence of price dispersion in markets for homogeneous goods is an empirically well-documented phenomenon. A recent survey of models developed to explain price dispersion, for instance, indicates that "data from over one hundred years suggests that [...] price dispersion in homogeneous product markets is ubiquitous and persistent" ( [5] , p. 2).
Labor markets seem to have a similar trait, as observable worker and firm characteristics do not entirely explain the variation in earnings (see [21] ).
In this paper we build a model that helps us understand the theoretical underpinnings of price dispersion in markets for homogeneous goods. Several different approaches have been offered in the past. The novelty of ours is that ex-ante heterogeneity, informational asymmetries or exogenous matching frictions-prominent assumptions in earlier investigations-do not play a role. 2 Equilibrium price dispersion arises because, on one hand, identical capacity-constrained sellers cannot fully commit to the list price; on the other hand, identical buyers cannot coordinate their search decisions, which contributes to create trade frictions. Basically, uncoordinated search leads to equilibrium demand heterogeneity and sellers realizing large demand can bargain prices up as buyers compete for the good.
To be sure, market frictions are crucial elements in earlier works on this theme. What differentiates our model is the way in which frictions arise. Earlier studies traditionally assumed that it is costly to get information about prices either due to a random process of sequential encounters or search with fixed sample size. Instead, we let buyers direct their search according to a process that is not random and that is based on costless observations of every list price. Such an approach follows in the footsteps of [22] or, more recently, [19] , [7] , [14] or [25] . We extend these studies in two respects; our model draws a clear distinction between list and sale price and displays the property that sale prices respond to local demand conditions. Indeed, in the typical directed search model excess demand simply leads to random rationing at the list price. 3 A richer model should account for the 2 Examples include the information heterogeneity in [4] and [26] ; the costly search process of [15] or [12] ;
the firm heterogeneity of [23] ; the random process that in [8] or [6] limits the availability of information on prices and in [10] prevents buyers from shopping at the cheapest stores; the predetermined visiting order of [3] , in which high-cost buyers search less and spend more. A nice survey is in [5] . 3 Some earlier work has focused on absence of price commitments. Among the studies closely related are the directed search models in [13] and [18] , where sellers can run auctions but buyers cannot renegotiatiate.
Unlike our study, only two sale prices result and the auction price is invariant to both aggregate and local demand factors. A two-price distribution emerges also in [15] , as a result of costly search and incomplete information on sellers' production costs (see also [16] ). In [20] , instead, matching is exogenously random observation that trades in some markets are settled above the list price when demand is unusually high and below if business is slow. 4 To account for this possibility, we relax commitment to list prices and introduce a prospect of renegotiation. For this purpose, we develop an explicit price-formation mechanism based on a multi-player strategic bargaining process whose main traits are that a seller's (re)negotiating clout strengthens with demand and haggling carries an explicit cost. As a result, sales occur without delay at prices that are nondecreasing functions of local demand. In this framework we prove existence of (strongly) symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium. In that outcome sellers post the same price and buyers, who are indifferent, select sellers at random. This lack of coordination generates equilibrium frictions;
sellers face random demand while buyers face rationing risk due to constraints in their mobility and in the seller's capacity.
We obtain several interesting findings. The main result is that a non-trivial distribution of sale prices arises whenever the seller cannot fully commit to the price originally listed. Second, we characterize the sale price distribution parametrically and demonstrate how different market features, such as the ratio of buyers to sellers, affect pricing strategies. Third, since the list price affects the equilibrium incidence of bargained trades, the model determines the pricing institution endogenously and, especially, pins down conditions under which fixed-price selling emerges as the trading custom (see also [9] ). Fourth, we assess the impact that different commitment limitations have on advertisements and distribution of sale prices finding, for instance, that average sale prices can be higher in markets where buyers are allowed to haggle over discounts.
We emphasize that all these findings are robust to assuming renegotiation mechanisms other than the bargaining process adopted, as long as they generate a sale price that is a nondecreasing function of demand. As a consequence, several empirically testable predictions on market behavior present themselves. For example, the model allows us to chart a precise link between list prices, distribution of sale prices and market tightness.
The reason is that in the model a seller's equilibrium advertisement and expected earnings hinge on the distribution of demand, which is easily determined. We find that in a "buyer's and renegotiation may take place because of assumed match-specific heterogeneity. The study in [8] focuses on the role of advertising but differs from ours in two dimensions. Buyers are asymmetrically informed since it is costly to list a price and advertisements are allocated randomly across buyers. Second, sellers commit to the list price and fulfill every order received so buyers do not face trading risk. 4 Houses tend to sell above their list price in densely populated areas, but not in Tippecanoe county.
Hotels offer discounts when business is slow but not on busy days. Labor markets offer similar examples. market," in which the sellers' customer base is small, aggressive competition sustains low advertisements and sale prices that are low on average but considerably scattered. Instead, in a "seller's market," with many buyers chasing few sellers, list prices are high and sale prices are high on average but less dispersed. Thus, the model can be used to study comovements between average transaction prices, their dispersion, and aggregate shocks to demand or supply. In a labor market context, the model can be used to calculate the distribution of workers' compensation based on observed wage postings and market tightness. If we interpret our model as one of workers and firms, for instance, we obtain a density function for realized wages that matches qualitatively the data (see [21] ).
Model and equilibrium concept
There are S ≥ 2 sellers or stores with one identical indivisible good from which they derive no utility, and B ≥ 2 identical buyers or customers who derive unit utility from the good.
Letting λ = B S denote the customer base or market tightness, we say that we are in a buyer's market if λ is small and in a seller's market if λ is large. Players are risk neutral and, since utility is transferable, there are gains from trade.
Agents play a strategic game of complete information over the course of three stages.
Here we give a brief overview and fill in the details later. In the first stage, sellers simultaneously and independently advertise a price r ∈ [0, 1], the 'list' or 'posted' price.
In the second stage, buyers observe prices and simultaneously and independently choose to match with one seller. In the third stage, matches are realized and, as in [22] , it is assumed that buyers have mobility constraints. Thus, after reaching a seller a buyer cannot shop elsewhere. In each match, a trade process takes place that might include renegotiation of the originally posted price r (more details later). At the end of this process players realize their gains. Specifically, if trade between the seller and a buyer occurs at price p ∈ [0, 1], then the seller gets utility p and the buyer 1 − p. Those who do not trade earn zero. Then, the game ends.
We now give more details about the third stage of the game. Since sellers might be visited by several buyers, we let n = 0, 1, ..., B denote the demand realized by a seller in the third stage. We assume that players at a store observe n and, if there is more than one customer, each of them has an equal chance of being served. In the subgame where a customer has been selected to be served, trade occurs at a price that might differ from the list price r, depending on assumptions on commitment. Thus, we will characterize the market by a commitment technology that specifies if renegotiation is allowed and who may request it. Since the seller, the customer, or both can have this option, we let θ=(θ b , θ s ) denote the commitment technology with θ i = 1 if agent i = b, s (b for buyer and s for seller) can request renegotiation, and zero otherwise. 5 Renegotiation involves a mechanism taken as given, based on a multi-player strategic bargaining process described in the next section.
We will study strongly symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium in this economy, i.e., outcomes in which play is symmetric both on and off the equilibrium path (see [1] ). We will move backwards in the analysis, first determining the subgame perfect sale price at a seller with n = 1, 2, ..., B customers. Then, we study buyers' optimal shopping choice, and finally sellers' optimal advertisements.
Trading at a store
Consider the third stage of the game, when a seller that has advertised r is visited by n = 1, ..., B customers. The trade process starts with the random selection of a customer.
Then, the game roughly proceeds as follows. The seller or the selected customer may have the option to request a renegotiation of the price r. If neither of them makes such a request then trade occurs at the list price r. Otherwise, the sale price is determined via a process of haggling that is costly-in that players rather settle rapidly-and such that the more customers are at the store, the greater is the seller's bargaining strength. We discuss this in detail below.
Bargaining
Suppose someone, seller or buyer, requests renegotiation. This initiates a process of negotiations that may span an indefinite number of rounds, indexed t = 0, 1, .... Due to mobility constraints, the number n of customers present at the seller is constant across rounds. For simplicity we let the seller always make the initial offer, q n , independent of who requests negotiations. If this offer is accepted then buyer and seller trade, payoffs are realized and the game ends. If the offer is rejected, then a new bargaining round takes place with probability β ∈ (0, 1). If the game stops without reaching an agreement, then every player earns zero payoff. 6 If the game continues, a random device selects a player among all those present at the 5 A practical way to commit to a price (or price range) is by means of hiring sale representatives. For example, a way to commit to a fixed price r is by firing reps trading at non-authorized prices. One could commit to never selling below r by compensating reps with the difference between the sale price and r. 6 A detailed and more general study of this bargaining process is in [11] where capacity is endogenous.
Assuming multiple rounds within a period is standard (e.g. [24] ). The mobility assumption captures the notion of costs from additional search in between bargaining rounds. store, to propose a new price. In each round t ≥ 1 the seller is selected with time-invariant probability γ ∈ (0, 1) and a buyer is selected otherwise. If the seller makes the offer, a random device selects the recipient with uniform probability. Otherwise, a random device selects a customer with uniform probability, to make an offer. In this manner buyers compete to make and receive offers. Once again, if there is agreement the game ends or else a new round occurs with probability β. The game continues in this manner until it either randomly stops or an agreement is reached, since participation cost and outside options are zero.
Proposition 1
The bargaining game at a store with n = 1, ..., B buyers has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium characterized by acceptance of the initial offer:
n(1−β)+βγ(n−1)
(1)
Corollary 2
The bargained price q n increases in n and q n ∈ (0, 1) for all n. 7 This bargaining framework has three desirable features. First, trade takes place at the unique price q n without delay. Indeed, since negotiations may break down with probability 1−β, the seller makes an initial offer that is weakly preferred by any buyer. Second, no-one gets the entire surplus, unless demand is infinite or some party cannot make counteroffers, i.e. lim n→∞ q n = lim γ→1 q n = 1 and lim γ→0 q n = 0. Finally, the equilibrium bargained price naturally responds to demand pressure since the seller's inventory constraint exposes buyers to consumption risk. Indeed, dragging negotiations allows other customers to jump in with better offers and the chance of this happening rises in n. As excess demand grows the seller's bargaining position gets stronger so, as n grows the negotiated price rises toward the buyer's reservation price.
Since customers are constrained in their mobility, negotiations are unaffected by factors present outside the store, such as the demand realized elsewhere. That is, we have ∂q n ∂B = ∂qn ∂S = 0. However, the incidence of negotiations does depend on market-wide factors, as these affect advertisements and so the sale price, as we show next.
Sale prices
Given the list price r and the expected bargaining outcome q n , we pin down the subgame perfect sale price, i.e., the price at which the transaction takes place. Denote it p n for a seller visited by n buyers and let p 0 = 0. Also, denote q 0 = 0 and q B+1 = 1. Here p n is the seller's utility and 1 − p n is the buyer's.
The interaction between seller and the n customers at the store proceeds as follows.
A buyer is selected with equal probability among all present. This agent, or the seller, may have the option to request negotiations, as specified by the commitment technology.
If no one requests negotiations, then trade takes place at the list price, p n = r. Else, the seller makes the first offer and trade occurs at the price p n = q n .
Focusing on pure strategies without loss in generality, denote by η i the probability that agent i = b, s requests negotiations, conditional on having the option to do so. Individual optimality implies
That is, a seller who has posted r will exercise the option to request negotiations only if he expects to be able to bargain the price up, i.e., r < q n . A buyer with a similar option will do exactly the opposite. The central result is that, whether the sale price ends up being lower, equal, or greater than the list price r, depends not only on the commitment technology, but also on the original posting.
For this reason, we will consider four general types of commitment technologies that formalize basic notions of trading restraints: If θ = θ N = (1, 1) there is no commitment to r so traders always negotiate. Trade occurs at the list price when there is full commitment, i.e., if θ = θ X = (0, 0) as in [22] or [7] .
Commitment is limited in the price floor case θ = θ F = (0, 1), when sellers can charge at least r, and with a price ceiling θ = θ C = (1, 0), when the sale price cannot exceed r. Let θ=θ k , for k = C, F, N, X, denote the commitment technology.
Proposition 3 Consider a seller who has advertised r ∈ [0, 1] and is visited by n = 1, ..., B buyers. Let q n ∈ [0, 1] be the unique price that would arise from a renegotiation, with {q n } a nondecreasing sequence. Then, the optimal sale price is
Corollary 4 The optimal sale price is a nondecreasing function of realized demand.
The proof of the Proposition is simple. Once a customer is randomly selected out of n, both buyer and seller expect q n to arise from renegotiation. Thus, it is optimal for the buyer to trade at p n ≤ r under price ceilings and for the seller to trade at p n ≥ r under price floors. Notice that p n is continuous and nondecreasing in r, bounded above by one and below by zero. Also, ∂p n ∂r = 0, 1 depending on both r and θ. We will say that sale prices at a store are responsive to that store's list price if ∂p n ∂r = 1 for some n. It should be clear that this requires some commitment. Indeed, ∂pn ∂r = 1 under fixed prices but also under price ceilings if r < q n for some n, and under price floors if r ≥ q n for some n.
Otherwise, ∂p n ∂r = 0, which is especially true under negotiations since p n = q n for all n. Corollary 4 indicates that transaction prices display a desirable property, they do not fall when demand increases. This property hinges on the fact that {q n } is nondecreasing, which of course is satisfied by the assumed strategic bargaining process. Corollary 4 is central to establishing the existence of equilibrium sale price dispersion, as we will see.
Thus, one may wonder if the results that follow are robust to assuming alternative trading mechanisms. The answer is a definite yes. Indeed, they will hold for any trading process that generates a nondecreasing sequence {q n }, auctions being an example.
Two lessons emerge from this analysis. Depending on available commitment, the sale price may be unresponsive to the list price, in which case r should not affect buyers' search behavior. Otherwise, if r does affect some sale prices, then a seller should be able to encourage visits by lowering his list price. Second, the realized demand may influence the sale price. In this case, if equilibrium demand is randomly distributed then we obtain a nontrivial distribution of sale prices.
Selecting prices and visiting sellers
We now study the shopping choices of a buyer and the advertising choice of a seller.
Recall that players make choices in isolation and that we focus on outcomes in which they act symmetrically both on an off the equilibrium path. We use a superscript star to differentiate the strategy of everyone else from that of a representative player.
The buyer's problem
Consider the second stage of the game, when buyers make shopping decisions. Let v i denote the probability that a buyer visits seller i = 1, ..., S and let
The buyer's strategy v :[0, 1] S ∆ S−1 maps the observed advertisements into probabilities of visit. As only one seller can be visited, the buyer's payoff corresponds to the expected utility from visiting the different sellers.
Exploiting strong symmetry, suppose seller i posted r and every other seller posted r * .
Denote by f n (B, v * i ) the probability that seller i is visited exactly by n buyers, given that every one of them plays v * i . Since buyers make uncoordinated choices, the probability of visiting any seller is independent across buyers. Hence, under symmetry, the distribution of buyers at store i is bin(B, v * i ), i.e., for n = 0, ..., B we have:
Because a buyer has probability f n (B−1, v * i ) of finding n = 0, ..., B−1 other customers at store i, his expected utility from going to store i is 1−p n+1 n+1 . Indeed, he buys with probability 1 1+n earning utility 1 − p n+1 . We thus let
denote the buyer's expected utility from visiting seller i.
It is easily proved that, all else equal, U i is lower at more 'popular' sellers, i.e. ∂U i
Indeed, as v * i grows the expected demand at store i grows, creating negative extensive and intensive margin effects. Being served at popular sellers becomes harder and the sale price may also be higher, since p n is nondecreasing in n. Since a buyer prefers to shop where his expected utility is the highest, (5) tells us that he can be indifferent between a cheap and an expensive store if the latter is likely to be less crowded.
Given strong symmetry, we can consider the representative buyer's selection of one seller versus all others. He can shop at store i that posted r and sells at prices {p n }, or he can shop at any other store h = i that posted r * and sells at {p * n }. Letting v * denote the selection of every other buyer, strong symmetry implies v * h = v * for all h, with:
Denote the buyer's expected utility from being at any store h = i by:
The buyer's payoff is thus v i U i + (1 − v i )U and so his best response correspondence is:
where
is the probability of visiting any other seller.
The seller's problem
Now consider the first stage of the game when prices are posted. The strategy of seller i is a selection r from the set [0, 1] that maximizes his payoff, i.e., his expected profit.
Given that every other seller selects r * in this stage, that buyers play the symmetric best response v * in the second stage, and given that in the third stage the possible sale prices are {p n }, then seller's i payoff is denoted by
There is strategic interaction among sellers because the choice r * of others affects seller's i expected demand Bv * i . The section that follows will make explicit this consideration, while here we are simply interested in defining the seller's best response.
To this end, let ϕ : [0, 1]
[0, 1] be a continuous correspondence with nonempty compact values such that ϕ(r * ) = [0, 1] defines the seller's choice set for any r * ∈ [0, 1].
Then, define the value functionŴ :
and the correspondence μ :
If μ is nonempty valued, then we say that r is optimal or a best response, if:
In a symmetric equilibrium strategies must be a fixed point of the player's best response. Precisely, advertisements must be identical and so must be buyers' search decision, i.e., for all i = 1, ..., S we have:
Definition 5 Given a commitment technology θ, a strongly symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium-an equilibrium for short-is a list price r, a search decision v, and a set of sale prices {p n } that satisfy (1), (3), (7), (8) (10), and (11) .
To recapitulate, in equilibrium prices are determined optimally once buyers match with a seller. In the second stage of the game, each buyer's shopping decision is optimal
given the strategies of all other buyers, sellers' advertisements and the expected sale price.
Finally, in the first stage, each seller's advertisement is optimal given the advertisements of all other sellers, buyers' shopping decisions and the expected sale price.
Note that the equilibrium distribution of demand at a store is endogenous and yet it is invariant to changes in the market parameters (such as λ). This is a desirable feature of the model since altering the market setting does not change the basic nature of buyers'
search behavior, which remains uncoordinated. Thus, any variation in the distribution of sale prices or the list price can be easily traced back to changes in sellers' behavior.
Equilibrium
This section is devoted to establishing the following result.
Theorem 6 Given any commitment technology θ, there always exists a strongly symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium. In equilibrium, each buyer's search behavior satisfies
while each seller advertises a price r * that, however, may not be unique.
The main lesson is that in equilibrium sellers will list an identical price and so buyers will distribute themselves randomly across store. This is at the heart of the existence of dispersion in sale prices. To prove the theorem we take two steps. First, we consider the second stage of the game. Given any pair of list prices (r, r * ) and the associated set of optimal sale prices {p n , p * n } B n=1 , we prove existence of a fixed point of the buyer's best response. Then, we move to the first stage and prove existence of a fixed point of the seller's best response, given buyers' optimal shopping decisions and optimal sale prices.
Equilibrium shopping decisions
We start with the following. Then, the buyer's best response (7) has a unique fixed
The main point here is that, if list prices affect sale prices, then only moderately different postings can leave buyers indifferent. Otherwise, the cheapest seller captures the entire market. If seller h posts r * ∈ R * , then seller i should also post a price from R * to receive some visits. All buyers visit seller i if he posts a really low price r ∈ R, but gets no visits if he prices too high, r ∈R. An immediate implication is the following.
Corollary 8 A seller's expected demand is a nonincreasing function of its advertisement.
Precisely, given that seller i posts r and all others post
The intuition is simple. Buyers care about the expected price, which is why raising the list price can only reduce the probability of being visited. Thus, a version of the law of demand holds as buyers are more likely to visit cheaper sellers. However, buyers care also about the probability of being served and it is harder to buy at a cheap store. What's more, with limited commitment higher demand may mean a high sale price. Basically, if I go to a cheap store I may end up empty-handed (trade risk) and if I buy I may pay a lot more than what is advertised (price risk). Hence, a seller must advertise really lower than others to capture the whole market.
While the bite of price risk (on a buyer's search decision) hinges only commitment limitations, the effect of trading risk rests on the parameter λ, which, if (12) holds, is exactly the demand expected by any store (see (4)). For instance, in a seller's market I might avoid a store that, unlike others, advertises a dirt cheap price or even hands out its good. The seller might have so many customers that it will be nearly impossible to trade. Conversely, when there are few buyers and many sellers, I might avoid a moderately pricier store even if I expect to be the only customer there. we have R * ⊂ [0, 1] for every r * . Seller i can capture the market by advertising sufficiently below his competitor (v * i = 1 for r ∈ R) and gets no buyers when he prices well above the market (v * i = 0 for r ∈R). Notice also that the set R * changes with r * and with commitment technologies. In Figure 1 sellers only compete through posted prices and so their prices cannot vary much if they both want to attract buyers. Thus, R * is small and grows smaller as r * increases. When sellers can bargain the price up, instead, list price competition is less important (Figure 2 ). Thus, R * is large and constant for low r * and shrinks only as r * grows above the highest bargained price (the vertical line traced at q 2 ), i.e., when i's competitor sells at fixed price p = r * .
Equilibrium list prices
Now consider the first stage of the game. The following proposition establishes existence of a fixed point of the seller's best response, completing the proof of existence of equilibrium.
Proposition 9
Let v and v i satisfy (8) and (13) for each buyer, and let {p n } satisfy (3).
Then, there exists a fixed point r = r * ∈ [0, 1] of the seller's best response.
The existence proof is a simple application of Kakutani's fixed point theorem. The intuition is also simple. The seller trades off revenue against expected demand, given a market price r * and given that buyers make optimal symmetric search choices. Corollary 8 tells us that if advertising more than r * generates higher revenue per sale, then this also discourages visits. Thus, the optimal r maximizes the seller's payoff by balancing these intensive and extensive margins.
We are now ready to characterize the equilibrium list price. In doing so we will write r = x to indicate that in equilibrium r takes the unique value x, and r = [x, y] if the list price can take any value on the nonempty set [x, y].
Proposition 10
The equilibrium list price can be characterized as follows. Given commitment θ=θ k we have r = r k with:
for a unique j, h = 1, ..., B and:
The proposition looks somewhat complex, so we start by making two basic observations and then build on them. First, with no commitment list prices affect neither sale prices nor buyers' strategies, which is why the list price is indeterminate, r N = [0, 1]. Second, under fixed prices there is a unique equilibrium advertisement, r X (see also [7] ). Obviously, posting zero is suboptimal; so is posting one, since by advertising slightly below the buyer's reserve value a seller can capture the entire market. Thus list prices are in the open unit interval. Now consider markets with price floors or ceilings.
Corollary 11
In markets with limited commitment the prevailing pricing institution is endogenously determined so the list price may not be unique. In particular, (i) if r X ≥ q B then we have the unique list price r F = r X under price floors and (ii) if r X ≤ q 1 then we have the unique price r C = r X under price ceilings.
With full or no commitment, the pricing institution is clearly exogenous. With limited commitment it is endogenous since the parameters determine the proportion of bargained as opposed to fixed-price trades. While we will be more precise about this later, here we simply note that equilibrium demand is randomly distributed so choosing r is akin to selecting the probability of haggling. A high r therefore implies a low probability of The converse is also true: bargaining can be the pricing institution under limited commitment. In fact, this is the source of indeterminacy in equilibrium advertisements.
Here is why. Inspection of (14) reveals that uniqueness of r F and r C depends on the sign of ω. Put simply, this constant measures the strength of the extensive margin effects, i.e., the change in a seller's payoff generated by a small reduction in his list price. This reduction raises the expected demand but this might not increase expected revenue. Indeed, the bargained price grows in the number of customers (see (1)) but not all sales are bargained (see (3)). Thus, posting a low price makes sense only if this attracts many more customers, i.e., when the extensive effects are strong, which corresponds to ω > 0. 9 This is why advertisements are low when ω > 0 (r h−1 < q B and q 1 < r j in (14)). 9 Intuitively, the numerator of ω can be positive or negative and it roughly accounts for the extra income that a seller expects to obtain from bargaining. Since bargained prices are high when demand is high, an
The possibility of indeterminate equilibrium list prices is straightforward. Buyers do not care about advertisements if, once at the store, prices are renegotiated and this is exactly the case if sellers post an extreme price, under limited commitment. For example, suppose r = q 1 is an equilibrium under price floors. Since p n = max(r, q n ) then buyers know the seller will always renegotiate the deal, raising the price, and so any r < q 1 is also an equilibrium. A similar argument applies to the case r = q B , under price ceilings.
Equilibrium advertisements can be further characterized with respect to commitment technologies and market parameters. However, it is much simpler to do so if we consider large markets because in that case the distribution of demand at a store becomes quite tractable. For this reason, let us study the distribution of buyers and prices.
Equilibrium distribution of sale prices
Absent full commitment, equilibrium sale prices will generally vary across sellers because buyers do not coordinate their search and p n is nondecreasing in n (Corollary 4). Hence, to discuss the equilibrium distribution of sale prices at a store we must first discuss the distribution of buyers at a store.
In equilibrium buyers visit any seller with probability 1 S so demand is binomially distributed at a store, bin(B, 1 S ), with expected demand λ and variance λ( S−1 S ). Letting Pr[n] = f n (B, 1 S ) denote the probability that a store is visited by n buyers, (4) implies:
Note that demand is not independently distributed over sellers; if a seller has many buyers, other sellers are likely to have few. Indeed, the distribution of demand in the market is multinomial with parameters B and 1 S , so demand covaries negatively across stores. We have cov(n i , n j ) = − λ S for any two sellers i = j with demand n i and n j (see [17] ). Thus, given λ, covariance goes to zero in markets with many sellers. This is why characterization of sale and list prices is easier in a large market.
Since a sale always occurs if there is at least one buyer, the probability of selling is
Thus, the probability of selling at price p n is:
Given a commitment technology θ k , we then let Pr[p|k] be the equilibrium probability that the store sells at price p ∈ [0, 1]. Under no commitment, (3) tells us that information increase in the probability of visits raises the numerator. This is divided by the number of competitors, so more competition reduces the benefit of a price reduction.
on the distribution of buyers is sufficient to characterize the sale price density function since p n = q n for all n. Under limited commitment, instead, we also need to also know the store's equilibrium advertisement.
Precisely, under no commitment, for any p ∈ [0, 1] we have
Since q n increases in n, average sale prices at the store (and in the market) grow with λ.
If we measure price dispersion using the coefficient of variation, we see that it is humpshaped in λ. Indeed, in a buyer's market most trades occur at low prices, and in a seller's market at high prices. Thus dispersion is highest for moderate values of λ. 10 Now consider limited commitment. Suppose in equilibrium r is in between the bargained prices q j and q j+1 , i.e., r = r j with
for a unique j = 0, ..., B. With price floors p n = r if n ≤ j and p n = q n otherwise, so for p ∈ [0, 1] we have: 
Goods are sold at the list price only when demand is below j+1. Therefore, the probability of fixed-price trading is j n=1 B n (S−1) B−n S B −(S−1) B , which depends on the equilibrium selection r. As noted earlier, if r ≥ q B (i.e., j = B) then p n = r for all n, i.e., fixed-price trading arises. If r ≤ q 1 we always have negotiations as p n = q n for all n.
A mirror image of the above finding applies to the case of price ceilings: To sum up, the equilibrium sale price distribution has a discrete support denoted
n=1 , but the various commitment limitations generate dissimilar distributions. Indeed, the different renegotiation patterns determine whether the price distribution satisfies (18) or if it gets truncated somewhere. This has implications for the payoff of the different players. To see it, given θ k , letp k = p∈P p Pr[p|k] define the mean sale price at a store. 
and a seller's demand has mean λ and coefficient of variation 1 λ .
Intuitively, as the market grows in size demand co-varies less and less across sellers, so in a large market the distribution of buyers is independent across sellers. Indeed, the distribution of demand at a store is the marginal distribution, which is a Poisson with parameter λ. It follows that in a large market expected demand is high in a seller's market and low in a buyer's market, while the coefficient of variation behaves in reverse.
The Lemma allows us to derive the price distribution at a store conveniently. One must simply notice that the probability of selling is Pr[n = 0] = 1−e −λ , so the probability of selling at price p n is:
for n = 1, ..., B
Straightforward calculations imply that the list prices in (14) and (15) are now:
We can now discuss the links between market structure, equilibrium advertisements and distribution of sale prices in a large market.
Proposition 14 Consider a large market. In equilibrium the list price is a nondecreasing function of λ and the average sale price is a strictly increasing function of λ. The effect of commitment on the list price can be characterized as follows:
The intuition for the first finding hinges on the "law of demand" from Corollary 8.
As λ grows, sellers need to compete less to get customers and so the equilibrium list price cannot fall. Indeed, r will generally increase, which is evident in markets with full commitment where ∂r X ∂λ > 0. To see why the average sale price is strictly increasing in λ consider the case with no commitment. In this scenario the list price is unresponsive to λ and the average sale price isp
λ n q n n! (e λ − 1) .
Clearly,p N is increasing in λ because {q n } is an increasing sequence. It follows thatp C andp F must also rise in λ since r F and r C are nondecreasing.
The proposition also reveals that the list price tends to be higher in markets where buyers can haggle over discounts; r is low under price floors, moderate under fixed prices, and high under price ceilings. The intuition is that buyers care about the expected sale price in directing their search. Hence, sellers list a higher price when customers have a chance to bargain it down. 11 Technically, the seller's first order condition (see the proof of Proposition 10) is:
Here, f n is the equilibrium probability of n visits and the numerator of the last term is the covariance of sale price with demand (positive and finite). In a market with many sellers this term is negligible, so the optimal r approximately equates the expected profit to the equilibrium probability of realizing excess demand. The latter is unaffected by commitment and so it is the left hand side of (23) that must adjust as commitment varies.
Since p n always equals r under fixed prices, can exceed it under price floors and can lie below it under price ceilings, we have r F ≤ r X ≤ r C . A direct consequence of this discussion is the following.
Corollary 15
Fixed-price trading arises endogenously if (i) λ is sufficiently large and θ = θ F or (ii) λ is sufficiently small and θ = θ C . The reverse is true for bargaining.
With limited commitment, trades occur exclusively at the posted price in one of two cases. When only sellers have the option to renegotiate and the customer base is large, or in the opposite scenario, when only buyers can renegotiate but there are very few sellers.
Otherwise, some haggling is always present and its extent depends on market tightness.
Intuitively, the magnitude of the list price reflects the level of competition for customers and so there is a λ above which sellers set r ≥ q B and a λ below which r ≤ q 1 . The first scenario, when λ is large, corresponds to fixed-price trading under floors and negotiated trading under ceilings. The converse is true for the second scenario of small λ.
If λ is moderate, instead, some haggling occurs and this leads to a non-degenerate distribution of sale prices. Characterizing this distribution is simple. The density function is generally hump-shaped, while it is declining if λ ≤ 1. 12 The dispersion of sale prices is greatest when the expected demand is moderate. It vanishes as λ grows because more and more sellers end up charging high prices.
Predictions on market behavior
To illustrate our analytical results we simulate several economies for the baseline parameters, where S = 6 and B varies from 2 to 40. In the subsections that follow we discuss separately equilibrium advertisements, sale prices, and incidence of negotiations. Figure 3 illustrates the main findings of Proposition 14. First, the equilibrium list price r is a nondecreasing function of expected demand λ. 13 For instance, consider the price floor case, r F . Here, sellers advertise a low price when demand is low because the risk of unsold inventory is high. This is especially evident when B ≤ 9, since the advertisement ends up at or below the minimum negotiable price q 1 , so every sale is negotiated and r is indeterminate (the shaded area). As expected demand increases the list price grows.
Advertisements

Figure 3 -Advertisements
Second, r tends to be higher in markets where sale prices cannot exceed what was initially advertised. Indeed, if sellers can bargain the price up then r F < r X unless demand is ample, which is when r F = r X . With price ceilings, instead, sellers trade at the fixed low price r X when buyers are scarce, but as B rises sellers prefer to negotiate occasional discounts and so list r C > r X . Eventually, sellers want to always negotiate, which is when 13 Moving left to right both market size and λ vary. The resuls are similar if the market size is large but fixed, and λ varies.
r C surpasses the maximum negotiable price q B and indeterminacy arises (the shaded area for B ≥ 10). Figure 4 illustrates the behavior of the average sale pricep at a store. As noted in Propositions 12 and 14,p is the highest under price floors and increases with λ. What is remarkable, however, is thatp C >p X when demand is small. That is to say, the average sale price is higher in a market in which, instead of trading exclusively at the list price, sellers commit to negotiate discounts. The reason is simple. Sellers who trade at the list price must compete aggressively, posting a low price, if demand is scarce. Instead, by giving buyers the option to negotiate discounts as car dealers do, sellers can list a higher price and end up negotiating infrequent discounts.
Average sale prices
Figure 4 -Average sale prices
The figure provides also a nice illustration of the endogeneity of the pricing institution.
Corollary 15 has indicated that fixed-price trading emerges in markets where λ is large and sellers can ask more than r, or λ is small and buyers can negotiate discounts. Indeed, for large λ the average sale price is identical under price floors and fixed prices, and for small λ the same is true under price ceilings and fixed prices. Assuming that full commitment is impractical and haggling is costly, the model also suggests reasons why negotiation patterns might differ across geographically separated markets. For instance, real estate sellers who face a large customer base would choose to advertise a price that is renegotiable upward (as it happens in LA county) but would do the opposite when expected demand is thinner (as in Tippecanoe county).
Endogenous pricing institution
14 Interestingly, the incidence of haggling is non-monotonic since both r and the expected demand grow with B; these intensive and extensive margin effects have opposing effects. For instance, if under price floors an increase in expected demand raises r just a little, then haggling may be more likely.
Distribution of sale prices
We conclude by illustrating how the distribution of sale prices varies with the expected equilibrium demand. Figure 6 considers the case of price floors, where the number of buyers is fixed at 40 while the number of sellers varies across panels.
Figure 6 -Density function of sale prices
Panel a illustrates a market where expected demand is less than available capacity, S = 160. Competition is so strong that sellers do not advertise above the minimum negotiated price q 1 , so there is always bargaining at a store. 15 The probability density function of sale prices is downward sloping because low demand realizations are the most likely. In the other panels we progressively remove sellers from the market, while keeping B fixed at 40, so λ increases. This lessens competition in the market and generates list and sale prices that are progressively higher as we move from panel b to panel d.
Low demand realizations become less likely as we move from panel a to panel d,
which is why the dispersion in sale prices initially rises and then falls monotonically. This 15 In the illustrations we set r = q1 whenever r = [0, q1].
occurs because as λ grows more and more sellers end up charging high prices. This also explains why the density function presents a "hump" for moderate values of λ (panel c) and becomes degenerate for λ large (panel d) since trade occurs almost exclusively at the posted price. Indeed, in panel d sellers face almost no trading risk since each of them will almost certainly meet at least a customer. As a result, the list price is very close the buyer's reserve value, r = 0.995, so that bargaining is very rare.
Final remarks
We have studied the theoretical underpinnings of price dispersion in a market where shopping decisions are based on price advertisements. Since sellers are constrained in their capacity-and buyers in their mobility-a multi-player strategic negotiation process might take place between seller and customers, depending on pricing restraints and local demand factors. In equilibrium, this creates a non-degenerate distribution of sale prices that is a function of market parameters. Hence, the model provides empirically testable predictions of market behavior.
For instance, our analysis predicts that we should observe list prices that are higher in markets where buyers can haggle, as opposed to markets where they cannot. Here, sellers will generally settle the deal below the sticker price but will give large discounts only if business is unusually slow. Car dealers seem to behave in this way. On the other hand, we expect low posted prices when sellers can bargain them up. Here, trades generally occur at the advertised price unless the demand is unusually large, which is reminiscent of the hotel industry's pricing behavior. To the extent that transaction and posted prices may differ in some segments of the macroeconomy, then the model can be further developed to construct a measure of consumers' purchasing power which does not solely rely on the typical CPI observations. Labor market applications are also possible. For instance, not all of the empirically observed earnings disparities can be explained by workers and firms' heterogeneity (see [21] ). Our model can help us account for some of the residual heterogeneity as it delivers a plausible nontrivial distribution of earnings even if workers and firms are homogenous.
Appendix 16
Proof of Proposition 1
A detailed discussion of this strategic bargaining game in a more general setting (capacity greater than one, and endogenous choice of capacity), is in Camera and Selcuk (2005) . Here, we provide a condensed proof.
We characterize the outcome of this bargaining game using the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) concept. We proceed as follows. First, we conjecture a SPE that satisfies two properties:
• Property 1 (No Delay). Equilibrium offers are accepted immediately.
• Property 2 (Stationarity). In equilibrium a player makes the same offer independent of the stage of bargaining.
Then we characterize the SPE. Finally we prove that what we have conjectured is indeed the unique SPE of this game.
Given Property 2, let q s j denote the seller's proposal to buyer j = 1, .., n, in any stage of the bargaining game. Similarly, let q b j denote the price buyer j proposes to the seller. For clarity, we initially let n = 2 and generalize the result to n > 2 subsequently.
Start by showing that along the equilibrium path every buyer proposes an identical price to the seller, and vice versa, i.e., q b j = q b and q s j = q s for all buyers j. In equilibrium, if buyer 1 gets to make an offer, he chooses
The seller's expected utility is as follows. With probability γ he will be chosen to make an offer. In that case, with probability 1 2 , buyer j = 1, 2 is selected, and the seller propose q s j to him. With probability 1−γ 2 buyer j is chosen to make the offer, and he propose q b j to the seller. Given Property 1, these offers are accepted immediately. Subgame perfection requires that q b 1 leaves the seller indifferent. By a similar argument, the offer of buyer 2 offer is such that:
Note that the RHS's of equations (24) and (25) are the same, since buyers care only about the seller's continuation value. Hence,
Now, let us focus on the offer made by the seller. In equilibrium, buyers should be made indifferent between accepting and rejecting the seller's offer, i.e.
Using q b j = q b and q s j = q s for j = 1, 2 in (24) and (26), we obtain the SPE offers
Now let n > 2. The seller makes the offer to a buyer randomly chosen, with probability 1 n . The proof is a slight adaptation of the one above. The key change is that instead of 1−γ 2 we now have 1−γ n , so that buyer's and seller's offers must satisfy:
where j = 2, ..., n. The game has a stationary SPE with q s = (n−β)(1−β+βγ) n(1−β)+βγ(n−1) , and q b = (n−β)βγ n(1−β)+βγ(n−1) . Finally, since we let the seller make the initial offer, if someone requests negotiations, we have that q n = q s . It can be proved that the supremum and infimum of the set of equilibrium payoffs are identical. This proves uniqueness. For details see [11] .
Proof of Proposition 7 and Corollary 8
Suppose that seller i posts r ∈ [0, 1] and every other seller posts r * ∈ [0, 1]. Given n, denote by p n and p * n the sale price at store i and in any other store; they satisfy (3). Consider the representative buyer, when every other buyer visits store i with probability v * i and any other store with probability v * . According to (7) this buyer is indifferent between seller i and any other store if U i = U , i.e., if
Using (8) we have v * as a function of v * i so we define the function g :
It follows from (7) that
Now we examine some properties of g. To start, one can prove that g (v * i ) > 0. Thus, ifv * i ∈ (0, 1) satisfies g(v * i ) = 1, thenv * i is unique. One can demonstrate that dv * i ∂r * ≥ 0 and dv * i ∂r ≤ 0. By the Intermediate Value Theorem if g(0) ≤ 1 ≤ g(1) then such av * i exists. One can prove that
Thus, we are ready to determine the fixed points in the buyer's best response.
Case 1. Sale prices are a function of list prices
Suppose p * n = p n for some n and some (r, r * ) ∈ [0, 1] 2 . In this case (3) tells us that the sale price is a non-decreasing function of the list price, in general, and it is strictly decreasing for some n ≥ 1 and some list prices. Of course this depends on the available commitment and n, as discussed in section 3.2.
One can prove that g(0) = 1 for a unique value r = α 0 (r * ) > r * and g(1) = 1 for a unique value r = α 1 (r * ) < r * , where α 1 (r * ) < α 0 (r * ). It can also be proved that α 0 (r * ), α 1 (r * ) ≥ 0 so that α 0 (r * ) can be above one and α 1 (r * ) can be below zero.
Thus, define the following pairwise disjoints sets partitioning the interval [0, 1]:
i.e., R R * R = [0, 1]. From the discussion above we have that some of these sets may be empty. For example, R = ∅ ifα 1 (r * ) < 0. However, it is immediate to establish that R * = ∅ always. It is clear that if α 0 (r * ) ≤ 1 then g(0) > 1 when r > α 0 (r * ), i.e., when r ∈R = ∅. Similarly, if α 1 (r * ) ≥ 0 then g(1) < 1 when r < α 1 (r * ), i.e., when r ∈ R = ∅.
Notice that if r ∈ R * then g(0) < 1 < g (1) . Thus, we have that v * i =v * i ∈ (0, 1) solves
Thus, we summarize the discussion above as follows:
Now consider the representative buyer's best response correspondence v i from (7):
Hence, the symmetric equilibrium strategy of buyers is such that for any i we have the
Observe that since the fixed point v * i : [0, 1] 2 → [0, 1] is a continuous function. It is easy to determine from (27) and (8) 
Case 2. Sale prices are independent of list prices
Here p * n = p n = q n for all n and all (r, r * ). In this case we have α 0 (r * ) < 0 and α 1 (r * ) > 1 for all (r, r * ), so R * = [0, 1]. It is also easy to see that v i = v * i = v * = 1 S for all i = 1, ..., S is the unique fixed point.
Proof of Proposition 9
When θ = θ N then any r = r * ∈ [0, 1] is a fixed point of the seller's best response.
Indeed, p n and p * n are independent of r and r * , and so are U i and U . Thus, W (r, r * ) is a constant for any pair (r, r * ).
Thus, consider θ = θ N . This implies ∂pn ∂r > 0 for some n and some r ∈ [0, 1], from (3). Consider (9) for seller i so that
where v * i satisfies (13) and p n satisfies (3). It is easily verified that, for any given r * ∈ [0, 1], the function W : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is continuous and quasi-concave in r. Continuity follos from the fact that f n (B, v * i ) is continuous in r (since v * i is continuous) and so is p n . Also, for each r * ∈ [0, 1], the function W maps the compact set [0, 1] of possible list prices r into the compact set [0, 1] because B n=0 f n (B, v * i ) = 1 and p n ∈ [0, 1]. By Berge's Maximum Theorem it follows that for any given r * ∈ [0, 1] the value func-tionŴ (r * ) is continuous and the "argmax" correspondence μ(r * ) is upper hemicontinuous with convex and compact values. Therefore, μ has a closed graph. We can therefore apply Kakutani's fixed point theorem. It follows that the set of fixed points of μ is compact and non-empty. This also establishes existence of equilibrium. In particular, since in equilibrium r = r * then we have v * i = 1 S from Corollary 8.
Proof of Proposition 10
To characterize the equilibrium list price
Since v * i must satisfy U i = U , we can use (5) and (6) to rearrange (9) as 
In a symmetric equilibrium, let (32)
We also define ω = B n=1 M n q n −A S−1 .
In equilibrium ∆ (r * ) = 0, so (32) implies 
We can write E[n] = B n=1 f n n = λ so (33) is
Below we analyze ∆ under each pricing convention, starting with fixed prices.
In doing so we will write r = r n to indicate that in equilibrium r takes the unique value r n in between the bargained prices q n and q n+1 :
for n = 0 (q 1 , q 2 ) for n = 1
[q j , q j+1 ) for n = 2, ..., B − 1 [q j , 1] for n = B
Instead, we will write r = [q n , q n+1 ] if the list price can take any value on that set.
1) Case θ = θ X : Inserting p * n = r * for all n into (32) we obtain
One can show that ∆ (r * ) > 0 and ∆ (0) < 0 < ∆ (1). Since ∆ is continuous, the Intermediate Value Theorem establishes that there exists a unique r X ∈ (0, 1) such that ∆ r X = 0, with r X = Hence, we must study ∆(r * ) on [q 1 , 1]. Obviously, if ∆(r * ) > 0 on that set, then r * = [0, q 1 )
is the equilibrium set. To have a unique equilibrium r * we need ∆(r * ) = 0 for some r * ∈ (q 1 , 1). Thus, suppose r * = r j ∈ [q j , q j+1 ) for some j = 1, ..., B. We have ∆ (r j ) = for r j ∈ [q j , q j+1 ).
One can demonstrate that ∆ (r * ) = 0 if r * ∈ [0, q 1 ) > 0 if r * ∈ [q j , q j+1 ) for all j = 1, ..., B − 1 and verify that ∆ (1) > 0, and ∆ (r * ) = ∆ (q 1 ) = ω for 0 ≤ r * ≤ q 1 .
Since ∆(r * ) is continuous and increasing on [q 1 , 1], then if ω < 0, by the Intermediate Value Theorem, there exists a unique r * ∈ (q 1 , 1). Precisely, there is a unique j = 1, ..., B
such that ∆ (r * ) = 0 for a unique r * ∈ [q j , q j+1 ). Using (36) we obtain
If ω ≥ 0 then we have a continuum of equilibrium advertisements r * = [0, q 1 ].
3) Case θ = θ C : Here we have p * n = min(q n , r * ), and so It follows that we must study ∆(r * ) on [0, q B ). Obviously, if ∆(r * ) < 0 then r * = [q B , 1] is the set of equilibrium advertisements. To have a unique equilibrium r * we need ∆(r * ) = 0 for some r * ∈ (0, q B ). Thus suppose r * = r j−1 ∈ [q j−1 , q j ) for some j = 1, ...B. Then for r j−1 ∈ [q j−1 , q j ).
We always have ∆ (0) < 0 and ∆(r * ) = ∆ (q B ) = ω for q B ≤ r * ≤ 1. Using (37) we obtain that there is a unique j = 1, ..., B such that ∆ (r * ) = 0 for r * = r C ∈ [q j−1 , q j ) with
One can prove that ∆ (r * ) ≥ 0 for all r * ∈ [0, q B ), when B and S are sufficiently large.
If ω > 0, then r * = r C is the unique equilibrium, by the Intermediate Value Theorem. If ω ≤ 0, then r * = [q B , 1] is the set of equilibrium advertisements.
Finally, one can prove that r F = r X if and only if r X ≥ q B , and r C = r X if r X ≤ q 1 and r C > r X if r X > q 1 .
Proof of Proposition 12
Let n = 1, ..., B. Recall that Pr[n|n = 0] is given by (16) , so the distribution of buyers is independent of θ. When θ = θ F we have p n ≥ q n for all n, while p n = q n when θ = θ N .
Hence,p N ≤p F . When θ = θ C then p n ≤ q n for all n and sop C ≤p N ≤p F .
Proof of Lemma 13
Fix λ ∈ R + and let B = λS and let S → ∞ (alternatively let S = B/λ and let B → ∞). We see that lim S→∞ cov(n i , n j ) = 0, i.e. n i and n j are independent random variables. This implies that as the size of the market grows unbounded, we can focus only on the marginal probabilities, that is the probability that any given seller is visited by n buyers. In this case, this marginal probability distribution is bin(B, 1/S). As S → ∞ the binomial distribution converges to a Poisson with parameter λ (see [17] , chapter 3).
Thus, (16) implies (21) as the market grows large while keeping λ constant.
Proof of Proposition 14
If we set B = Sλ and let S → ∞ we have lim S→∞ M n S 2
= lim S→∞ f n (B, 1 S ) 1 − n−λ S−1 = e −λ λ n n! lim S→∞
Then, from the definitions of r j and r h−1 in Proposition 10 we obtain (22) . It is immediate that ∂r X ∂λ = −[e λ (1 − λ) − 1] > 0. To demonstrate the other claims let f n 1 S = f n . Then, use (34) and notice that cov(n, p) > 0 (for n = 0 we have p 0 = 0 and p n > 0 otherwise) and it is minimized when p n = r for all n. Also, cov[n, p] < ∞ since E[np] < ∞. When B = Sλ then lim S→∞ cov(n,p) S−1 = 0. Thus, an approximate solution for r in a large economy must solve B n=1 f n p n = 1 − f 0 − f 1 . This leads to the expressions in (22) . If r F = r X (i.e. if r X < q B ) then we have
Since B n=j+1 f n q n > B n=j+1 f n r F and 1−f 0 −f 1 = r X j n=1 f n + B n=j+1 f n r X , then r F < r X . Similarly, r C > r X if r X > q 1 .
Finally, to demonstrate that r F and r C are increasing in λ notice that in equilibrium we must have E [p] = 1 − f 0 − f 1 . The RHS grows in λ. Since p n < 1 for all n ≥ 1 and ∂pn ∂r > 0 for some p n , then ∂r ∂λ > 0 for the equality to hold.
